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Response
Making Terrorism Risk Analysis Less Harmful and More
Useful: Another Try
Gerald G. Brown1,∗ and Louis Anthony (Tony) Cox, Jr.2
Although Ezell claims that we only “repackaged
in a new article the limitations identified by Ezell et
al. of PRA in terrorism risk analysis,” he neither ad-
dresses nor refutes any of our substantive technical
points and examples, and his comments reflect a fun-
damental lack of understanding of our main ideas.
We are therefore grateful for this opportunity to clar-
ify our reasoning in light of his comments, as follows.
1. Intelligence analysts cannot condition on
knowledge that they do not have. Ezell asserts
that we, and the National Research Coun-
cil, have overlooked what he calls the “ob-
vious fact” that “intelligence analysts con-
sider terrorist knowledge . . . when assessing
probabilities of attack.” However, a major
point of our article is that analysts cannot
consider what terrorists know, when the ter-
rorists know more than the analysts. The ex-
ample in our Tables III and IV shows why
attempting to have our “intelligence analysts
consider terrorist knowledge . . . when assess-
ing probabilities of attack” may be worse than
useless when the attacker knows things our
analysts do not. (More formally, if what the
attacker knows is represented by a finer infor-
mation partition than what we know, then the
attacker’s action probabilities can be math-
ematically unmeasurable with respect to our
information partition.) We believe that useful
risk assessment requires acknowledging that
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attackers often have knowledge that we lack,
and that we cannot produce valid probabilis-
tic estimates for attacker actions that are in-
formed by the knowledge we lack. Our best
bet is not to pretend that there is some way
(“obvious” or not) to accomplish this impos-
sibility, but rather to proceed under the more
realistic assumption that our experts cannot
always form predictively useful attack prob-
abilities when they have insufficient informa-
tion.
2. Simple examples suffice for proofs by con-
tradiction. Ezell’s complaint that “simple toy
examples offered by the authors lack proof
that the methods would scale to do terror-
ism risk analysis” misunderstands the nature
of these proofs. Showing via a small toy ex-
ample that a general claim is mistaken suffices
to disprove it. For example, Ezell et al.’s re-
peated claim that Risk = Threat × Vulnera-
bility × Consequence (the “TVC” framework)
provides a useful way to allocate defensive re-
sources and priorities to combat terrorism is
readily disproved by showing that the correla-
tions among terms (which the formula omits)
can reverse the rankings provided by the for-
mula. A simple example suffices to make this
point (Cox 2008), but the point is entirely gen-
eral.
3. The poor performance of expert judgments
about future political and conflict events is
well established by empirical studies. Ezell
writes that “The authors’ implication that
the U.S. intelligence community’s judgment
on our adversaries is less useful than purely
random guesses is presented without proof
and is aloof . . .”. In fact, we do prove (con-
structively, via our first example) that any
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judgment of an adversary’s attack probabili-
ties can be self-defeating, and hence strictly
less accurate than a purely random guess,
if the adversary uses the judgment to de-
cide where to attack. More importantly, we
stated that: “Although we have made these
points here using simple hypothetical exam-
ples, empirical research also abundantly con-
firms the inability of our best experts to
usefully predict what other nations, combat-
ants, or political leaders will actually do: ex-
pert probability judgments for such events
tend to be slightly less useful than purely
random guesses [Tetlock 2005]” (emphasis
in original). The references we cite support
our claims. Ezell objects that, for DARPA’s
Integrated Crisis Early Warning System
(ICEWS), “the standards for accuracy are
high—80% accuracy and 70% precision.”
But, our original point stands. The follow-
ing warning, from an evaluation of the actual
(not desired) performance of the ICEWS sys-
tem, shows why the “high standards” to which
Ezell refers do not translate to high predictive
accuracy in practice.
We early on discovered that we could come close to
achieving our benchmark performancemetrics [80% ac-
curacy and 70% precision] using naı¨ve models, which
included lagged values of the EoI [Events of Inter-
est] dependent variable, and a small number of policy-
irrelevant correlates like size of population, presence or
absence of mountainous terrain, and the like. Though
such a naı¨ve model may retrospectively achieve accept-
able levels of overall performance, it is useless for real
world applications . . . [M]odels that rely on dependent
variable lags, as seen above, provide only an illusion of
high performance or goodness of fit. A naı¨ve model con-
taining only lags of the dependent variable may score
well on indicating the presence of some EoIs, but will
miss every new onset and cessation of conflict, literally
by definition. The illusory good performance metrics
also operate as a disincentive to continue the search for
more insightful, actionable crisis antecedents. (O’Brien
2010, emphases added)
The public derives no benefit from “the illu-
sion of high performance.” We suggest that, rather
than retrospectively overfitting regression models to
past data, and then misleadingly advertising that “the
standards for accuracy are high—80% accuracy and
70% precision,” it is more useful to recognize that
such models do not perform well prospectively; that
they are too often “useless for real world applica-
tions” (or nearly so) in reducing terrorism risks; and
that we need to deal with this fact.
4. Poor risk analysis threatens us all. Ezell’s pas-
sionate defense that “[m]any of these intelli-
gence analysts risk their lives collecting data
and making these difficult estimates” provides
no guarantee that the resulting estimates are
valid or useful. We believe they are not be-
cause the TVC framework does not ask the
right questions or elicit relevant information
for predicting risks, as explained in our pa-
per. (It is also far from clear just what is
life-threatening about making up numerical
estimates for threat, vulnerability, or conse-
quence numbers—a task frequently assigned
to junior staff in various organizations com-
peting for DHS dollars.) Of course, using a
framework that is incapable of predicting how
what we do will affect risk—as the discussion
of Tables III and IV of our paper shows is
the case for the TVC framework—may put
the lives of other citizens at risk, by allocating
defensive resources where they do little or no
good, or even do harm, as shown in our exam-
ples. But the occupational hazards of guessing
at “TVC” numbers are not self-evidently life-
threatening, or even career-limiting, for those
involved.
5. Better risk analysis is easy. We have tried,
by exposition and example, to show that cor-
rectly applying existing techniques of applied
probability, modeling, and optimization can
provide useful insights for guiding effective al-
location of limited defensive resources. Un-
fortunately, feeding expert judgments into the
Risk = Threat × Vulnerability × Consequence
framework is not how to do it—for example,
because the framework omits crucial infor-
mation needed to predict and manage risks
(such as correlations among terms, or bang-
for-the-buck information about risk reduc-
tions achieved by implementing different sub-
sets of possible actions); because its key terms
are not well defined (Cox 2008); because our
experts often lack the information needed to
provide useful estimates, even if the concepts
made sense; and because the framework has
never been shown to produce good results
(e.g., better than random). Better risk analy-
sis is easy, but requires replacing the TVC ap-
proach with more useful analyses.
Ezell concludes with a brief account of the “sub-
stantial resources” that the U.S. government has
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been investing in “research to develop and test new
theories and approaches,” and of a five-year de-
bate “about PRA good vs. PRA bad.” This misses
the fact that whether PRA is good or bad—or,
rather, useful or useless—depends on how it is done.
Rather than continuing to devote “considerable re-
sources” to creating simplistic, unvalidated, and low-
performing “new theories and approaches” such as
the TVC framework, we believe that the United
States would be served far better by having compe-
tent risk analysts apply well-established techniques
from operations research and risk analysis to model
uncertainty and to robustly improve our infrastruc-
ture resilience and defensive resource allocations.
Techniques of reliability analysis, causal model-
ing, simulation-optimization, robust and hierarchical
optimization, and diversification and hedging of in-
vestment portfolios against uncertainties can demon-
strably do far more than expert judgments and TVC
calculations, for a fraction of the cost, to make our
infrastructures more secure and resilient to natu-
ral and manmade attacks. To get there, however,
we must stop denying that the TVC framework has
fundamental logical and practical flaws that make
it invalid for risk assessment. Ezell prefaces his pa-
per with the aphorism: “All models are wrong, but
some are useful.” However, there is no guaran-
tee that TVC models are useful in general, or usu-
ally, for correctly assessing attack risks or setting
priorities, for reasons discussed in our paper and
its references (e.g., that TVC typically omits the
information that attackers use to decide when and
where to attack). While the TVC framework offers
simplicity, it confines analysis within a framework
that does not best serve the operators and planners
who are working diligently to protect our people and
infrastructure. It is time to adopt more useful analyt-
ics. We must also stop pretending that our experts
can produce predictively useful probabilities as in-
puts to the framework when they lack adequate in-
formation; stop pouring money into “research” to de-
velop simplistic and flawed “new approaches” that
do not address the fundamental limitations of the
current approach; and start replacing it with sound
predictive and prescriptive techniques, such as those
listed above.
Only by vigilantly identifying, discussing, ac-
knowledging, and rejecting flaws in approaches put
forth under the name of “risk analysis” can profes-
sional risk analysts protect the long-term credibility
and value of their profession. In our opinion, the
TVC framework is a prime example of a currently
fashionable approach that should not be used, and
competent risk analysts should inform their clients of
its deep technical flaws and use better analytics in-
stead. Our reasons are fully explained in our paper
and its references. We appreciate this opportunity to
summarize some of them.
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